

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----108763 161749Z /42
P 161728Z AUG 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3242
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12527

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15, 1978
(SALT TWO-1843)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 15, 1978

A SUBSTANTIVE AND AS YET NOT FULLY RESOLVED TASK
ENTRUSTED TO THE DELEGATIONS IS THE PREPARATION OF A
DRAFT TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC
GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.

AT THE MAY 17, 1978 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION,
GUIDED BY THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING
NEGOTIATIONS AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL IN MOSCOW IN APRIL 1978,
TABLED NEW COMPROMISE PROPOSALS FOR THE THIRD AND FOURTH
SECTIONS OF THAT DOCUMENT.

SUBSEQUENTLY, A NEW PROPOSAL ON THE JOINT STATEMENT
WAS TABLED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AS WELL.

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THERE EMERGED A BASIS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD
RESOLVING THE AFOREMENTIONED ISSUE ON A MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

TODAY I WILL SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS ON CERTAIN
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DRAFT

TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES.

THE FIRST SECTION OF THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT RECORDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT GUIDELINE THAT THE USSR AND THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS FOR THEIR FURTHER QUALITATIVE LIMITATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED THAT IN FURTHERANCE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON QUESTION INVOLVED IN THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDUCING AND AVERTING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, TO SEEK MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY, BY, INTER ALIA, LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MOST DESTABILIZING TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THIS IS THE JOINT POSITION OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL FORMULATIONS, MOREOVER, FORMULATIONS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE JOINT APPROACH, IS NOT APPROPRIATE AND CAN ONLY DELAY THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN LIGHT OF THIS, IT IS ADVISABLE TO DELETE THE BRACKETED WORDS AT THE END OF THE FIRST SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, FOR THEY ARE SUPERFLUOUS.

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NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND SECTION--ON VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THE WORDING OF THIS SECTION SHOULD PRECISELY AND CONSISTENTLY EMBODY THE THOUGHT THAT AGREEMENTS REGARDING MEASURES IN THE AREA OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT--AS IS THE CASE NOW AND, NATURALLY, AS WILL BE THE CASE IN THE FUTURE--TO APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PRECISELY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. BEARING IN MIND THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WORDING COULD BE ADDED HERE ON TAKING, AS APPROPRIATE, COOPERATIVE MEASURES, HOWEVER, OF COURSE, BY NO MEANS SO AS TO UNDERMINE OR PERMIT ANY EROSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREED PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AND WILL NOT AGREE TO THIS.

NOW ON THE THIRD SECTION. THE REVISED WORDING FOR THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, TABLED AT THE

AUGUST 4, 1978 DRAFTING GROUP MEETING, MADE IT POSSIBLE TO BRING THE POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS. HOWEVER, THERE ALSO REMAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

THE SOVIET SIDE FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT ACHIEVING THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES INDICATED IN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE BASED ON AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. SUCH AN APPROACH HAS BEEN AT THE

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 (ISO) W
-----074976 221602Z /42

P 161728Z AUG 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3243
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

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BASIS OF THE DISCUSSIONS FROM THE VERY INCEPTION OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS, SINCE 1969. THIS WAS REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED, AND AT ALL STAGES AND ON ALL LEVELS WAS CONSIDERED THE ONLY PROPER AND POSSIBLE APPROACH. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WE WILL ADDRESS NEW SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WILL BE MORE FAR-REACHING THAN THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON AN ACCOUNT FOR RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WILL GAIN IN IMPORTANCE IN WORKING OUT JOINT SOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THIS IS OF EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE TO BOTH SIDES.

AT THE JULY 27, 1978 MEETING THE U.S. DELEGATION

SAID THAT THE FORMULATIONS BEING WORKED OUT AND ALREADY
AGREED FOR THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WILL ENSURE
THAT "ALL CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION"
IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH AN
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INTERPRETATION IS INDEFINITE AND DOES NOT MOVE US TOWARD
ACHIEVING A JOINT SOLUTION.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT A
PROVISION CONCERNING AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL RELEVANT FACTORS
THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION MUST BE EMBODIED
IN THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT, RATHER
THAN BE VAGUELY IMPLIED THEREIN.

A PROVISION ON REDUCING THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF
NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES IS A
MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE THIRD SECTION OF THE
DRAFT. SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BECOME AN IMPORTANT STEP
TOWARD STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.
THEREFORE, REDUCING THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR
WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES WHICH EXERT A
MOST DIRECT INFLUENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, CANNOT
BUT BE AN IMPORTANT AND INTEGRAL GUIDELINE FOR SUBSEQUENT
NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALL, THE AGREED PROVISIONS REFER
TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND TO THEIR QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS.
IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO REDUCE
THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC
DELIVERY VEHICLES. AS YOU KNOW, THIS QUESTION IS
CONSTANTLY AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION OF INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC OPINION. ATTEMPTS TO AVOID INDICATING SUCH A
GUIDELINE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE POLITICALLY
UNJUSTIFIED, AND IN PRACTICAL TERMS WOULD BE FROUGHT WITH
THE DANGER OF UNDERMINING THE STRUCTURE THAT THE SIDES
SEEK TO ERECT AS A RESULT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS--
SALT-III. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A GUIDELINE FOR THE
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NEGOTIATIONS THERE COULD ARISE THE DANGER OF A CERTAIN
NEW LOOP IN THE SPIRAL IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
RACE, WITH ALL THE ENSUING UNFAVORABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR
STRATEGIC STABILITY AND FOR MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPLE OF
EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES.

THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSALS, TO BE INCLUDED IN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, REGARDING AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND A REDUCTION OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO STRESS THAT THROUGHOUT THE TEXT, INCLUDING IN THE TITLE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, IT IS ADVISABLE TO USE THE TERM "STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS"; THESE ARMS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS DETERMINES THE SOVIET SIDE'S ATTITUDE TO THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON SO-CALLED "STRATEGIC DEFENSES."

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSALS PROVIDE EVERYTHING NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINING ASPECTS OF THE DRAFT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. OF COURSE, WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE U.S. SIDE IN THIS CONNECTION. EARLE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 aug 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA12527
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780342-0250
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USSALTTWO JOINT
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780860/aaaabyat.tel
Line Count: 247
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e7fbf662-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 feb 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1729389
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15, 1978 (SALT TWO-1843) SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 15, 1978
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, (SEMENOV)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e7fbf662-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014